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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze non traditional
logistical support approaches for Nondevelopmental Items
(NDI) . NDI acquisition capitalizes on the use of commercial
"state-of-the-art" technologies while providing DOD with
effective and economical solutions to near term operational
requirements. This thesis primarily focuses upon contractor
logistical support strategies which are unique to NDI
acquisition programs. Four current NDI programs were
researched for logistical implications. These included: 1)
the AN/ARN-148 Omega Navigational System, 2) the Secure
Telephone Unit III, 3) the AN/PSS-12 Mine Detector, and 4) the
AN/PSN-11 PLGR GPS Receiver. The NDI logistical support
strategies identified and analyzed were: 1) No support
required (discard system upon failure) , 2) total contractor
support, 3) organic support, and 4) a combination of organic
and contractor support. The advantages and disadvantages of
these support methods were analyzed. Potential logistical
support strategies are identified that may enable U.S. Army
program managers to maximize the benefits of using
individualized and tailored support strategies for NDI
acquisition. This thesis concludes by summarizing the
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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze non traditional
logistical support approaches for nondevelopmental item
acquisitions. This thesis primarily focuses upon total
contractor support strategies for nondevelopmental items since
nondevelopmental item alternatives usually require a departure
from traditional support methods. Alternative logistical
support strategies will be identified and analyzed for several
different major nondevelopmental item acquisitions. In
addition, these acquisition strategies will be examined in
order to identify potential support problems for future NDI
acquisitions.
B . BACKGROUND
DOD Directive 5000.1, "Major and Non-Major Defense
Acquisition Programs," states that acquisition strategies and
programs shall be tailored to accomplish established program
objectives and control risk. Prudent acquisition management
dictates that new acquisition programs only be initiated after
fully examining alternative ways of identifying military
needs. All acquisition strategies must consider maximum use
of commercial and other Nondevelopmental Items (NDI) to meet
military requirements [Ref. l:p. 1-2].
The former (USD (A)) , Mr Yockey, indicated that the reduced
urgency for modernization and reduction in our Armed Forces
mean that DOD will acquire fewer weapon systems in the future
and the acquisition budget will be reduced accordingly. Also,
DOD plans to broaden its access to the industrial base by
shifting from military-unique products and processes to
commercial counterparts as much as possible [Ref. 2:p. 2-8],
One initiative to stimulate efficiency and competition is
streamlining weapons systems maintenance operations by
allowing military maintenance depots and private firms to
compete for maintenance work. Use of commercial items enables
DOD to capitalize on economies of scale and achieve
effectiveness in peacetime. Commercial capability enables
defense downsizing to proceed more coherently. For example,
commercial engine production is the foundation for automobile,
truck, and tank engine manufacturing. It is not necessary to
keep the tank engine industrial base in operation when
efficient commercial processes exist [Ref. 2:p. 2-8].
Commercial NDI capabilities also create opportunities for
DOD to quickly introduce technological breakthroughs in the
form of high-quality, high-performance, low-cost, off-the-
shelf equipment to satisfy military requirements [Ref. 3: p.
4]. As these off-the-shelf commercial items are introduced to
the forces, they will require logistical support and possibly
support facilities. The DOD has recognized the need for
innovative and cost-effective commercial alternatives to
offset the high cost of developing unique military systems.
A nondevelopmental item acquisition represents a new pathway
and philosophical shift in the requirements process and
materiel development [Ref. 4:p. 1-1].
Commercial suppliers and Government support facilities
have key roles in equipping the military. Government depots
(and arsenals) capabilities that are militarily unique play a
key role in sustaining our military forces. Private
contractors perform work across broader spectrums and promise
efficiencies in a competitive environment [Ref. 5:p. 15-16].
Therefore, the intent of the NDI alternative is to provide DOD
with effective and economical solutions to its essential
operational requirements [Ref. 6: p. 2].
C. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research is to examine the
feasibility of using contractor support to reduce costly
supportability problems. This study is conceptual in nature.
The goal of this study was not to develop a generic Integrated
Logistics Support Model for nondevelopmental item support
strategies, but rather to explore the potential benefits and
uses of a flexible support strategy. This research will
identify possible logistical support strategies that may
enable U.S. Army Program Managers to maximize the benefits of






Should the Department of Defense (DOD) utilize total
contractor support for Nondevelopmental Item acquisitions?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
a. What is nondevelopmental item acquisition?
b. What are the most commonly used logistical support
strategies in nondevelopmental item acquisition?
c. What logistical support requirements are considered in
the design of nondevelopmental item acquisition
support systems?
d. How does the anticipated operational environment
affect the logistical support strategy?
e. Are Integrated Logistical Support Plans aligned to the
NDI acquisition strategy selected?
E. SCOPE OF THESIS
The research will determine the feasibility of using
contractor support in order to reduce costly supportability
problems. This study is intended to identify the best uses of
total contractor support for nondevelopmental acquisitions.
The study will not develop a generic Integrated Logistics
Support model for nondevelopmental item support strategies,
but rather examine the potential benefits and uses of a
flexible and individualized support strategy. These
nondevelopmental items were selected based upon life-cycle
costs and the support strategy selected: total contractor
support, contractor/organic support, or organic support.
F. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology consists of an archival-based
method. The information used for this research came mostly
from available literature on system acquisition,
nondevelopmental acquisition, and logistical support. Primary
sources included DOD official documents and personal/telephone
interviews with a small but representative sampling of program
managers and logisticians for their personal insight on
nondevelopmental acquisition strategies. Secondary sources
included publications or materials gathered by other
investigators. The literature review included current
acquisition directives and instructions (specifically DOD
instructions 5000.1 and 5000.2 of 23 February 1991) and
military studies on acquisition, NDIs, and private industries.
6. ABBREVIATIONS
Appendix A is a list of acronyms used in this thesis.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter II provides the general background and theoretical
framework for discussing nondevelopmental acquisition and
logistical support implications for this study. This chapter
explores the following areas: an overview for the acquisition
process, the implications of nondevelopmental acquisition for
the acquisition process, and some of the advantages and
disadvantages of Nondevelopmental Item (NDI) procurement
compared to a "traditional or classical" acquisition
procurement.
B. ACQUISITION PLANNING PROCESS
This section will discuss the acquisition process and how
nondevelopmental item acquisition differs from a traditional
research and developmental acquisition.
"The purpose of the acquisition process is simple. It is
to develop, produce, supply, and support weapons systems in
order to achieve the operational goals of the Armed Services"
[Ref. 7: p. 4]. In other words, the output of the acquisition
process is to provide a materiel solution or service to
support these operational goals or needs.
It is important to understand how acquisition policies
influence the acquisition process. The President, Congress,
and DOD work to develop and establish National Security
objectives, goals, and policies for the Armed Services. Once
these National Security policies are formed, they are
incorporated into acquisition policies. Basic guidance for
acquisition programs comes from the President's Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) which provides program guidance
though Circular A-109, "Major Systems Acquisitions," dated 5
April, 1976.
There are other influences that affect acquisition
policies also. Sometimes the results from special studies can
affect acquisition policies. For example, Circular A-109
reflected many of the recommendations of the 1972 Commission
on Government Procurement. The Commission recommended that
the Executive branch of Government provide a standard
organization policy, to include DOD, and emphasized the need
for a shift in fundamental policy toward commercial product
acquisition [Ref. 4: p. 1-1].
Today, this guidance is reflected in DOD directives. DOD
Directives 5000.1, "Major and Non-Major Defense Acquisition
Programs," and DODD 5000.2, "Defense Acquisition Program
Procedures," establish general policies and procedures for
managing major and non-major defense acquisition programs.
These documents expand Circular A-109 and are designed to
provide a single, uniform system for planning, designing,
developing, procuring, maintaining and deposing of all
equipment, facilities and services for DOD [Ref. 7: p. 5].
These policies help forge a closer, more effective interface
among DOD ' s two major decisionmaking support systems affecting
acquisition:
• Requirements Generation System.
• Acquisition Management System.
These characteristics and relationships define the
integrated management framework for defense acquisition.
Elements of the decisionmaking systems are adjusted as
necessary to assist the Secretary of Defense in
decisionmaking as circumstances change.
1 . Requirements Generation
When the acquisition process identifies a need for a
new hardware system, the acquisition process begins with the
necessary requirements documents [Ref. 7: p. 21]. Once a need
is identified that requires a materiel solution,
nondevelopmental item acquisitions are one of the first
strategies considered.
Acquisition programs can begin in a number of
different ways. For example:
• Replacement for an existing system that has become
obsolete.
• A new threat is identified that requires a new system
design to counter that threat.
• DOD ' s missions change which requires new equipment.
• New technology is inserted into existing programs or
sparks the development of new systems.
a. Mission Area Analysis
The acquisition process begins with a Mission Area
Analysis (MAA) which is conducted by the service component.
The Mission Area Analysis is a continuing process that
identifies the perceived threat, technology changes, and
inputs from operational personnel that may indicate a
modification to existing equipment or development of a new
system. This analysis may indicate the service component
(also known as the user) has a deficiency or need that
requires a military doctrine change or a materiel solution.
If a doctrine change is not the solution, then a materiel
solution is considered. The Mission Area Analysis comes into
play again because a market surveillance is conducted as part
of the MAA. The commercial market is reviewed for technology
and systems that may fulfill operational requirements. Thus,
market surveillance helps DOD avoid some of the costs
associated with research and development efforts if commercial
products and services can be purchased directly from industry
[Ref . 7: p. 6]
.
b. Mission Need Statement
The Mission Need Statement (MNS) follows the MAA
and is developed by the service component. Mission needs are
identified as a direct result of continuing assessments of
current and projected capabilities relating to military
threats and national defense policy. Figure 1 shows the









Figure 1 Requirements Evolution, Source [REF: l:p. 2-2]
The Mission Need Statement defines projected needs in
broad operational terms, e.g., "The need to impede the
advance of large armored formations 200 kilometers beyond the
front lines" [Ref. l:p. 2-3]. The intention of the MNS is not
to advocate a particular solution alternative, but to identify
a need that requires some solution. These broad statements
are continually refined as they progress though acquisition
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process and become more detailed as they pass through
successive decision points. Figure 2 depicts how Mission Need
Statements are processed.
MISSION NEED STATEMENT FLOW




































Figure 2 Mission Need Statement Flow, Source [Ref: l:p. 2-4]
These statements are forwarded through established
review channels to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
which is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The Council reviews each Mission Need Statement to
determine if a materiel solution is necessary. If a MNS is
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confirmed by the Council, it is forwarded to the Under
Secretary of Defense For Acquisition (USD(A)) for approval.
Next, the (USD(A)) may send the MNS to the Defense Acquisition
Review Board (a Joint member board) for further evaluation.
The Defense Acquisition Review Board may recommend proposed
solutions for further study at a Milestone decision review
[Ref. l:p. 2-5]. (The milestone decision process will be
explained in further detail later in this chapter.
)
c. Operational Requirements Document
The Operational Requirements Document is developed
by the service component after the Mission Need Statement is
approved. The objective of the ORD is to identify minimum
acceptable performance requirements which help shape the
acquisition program baseline [Ref. 8:p. 4-B-l]. Like the
Mission Need Statement, the Operational Requirements Document
will be updated throughout the acquisition process.
2. Acquisition Management
The interaction between requirements generation and
acquisition management continues through structured logical
phases separated by major decision points, called milestones
[Ref. l:p. 1-2]. This management system provides a
streamlined management structure that is an event-driven
acquisition process linking milestone decisions to
demonstrated accomplishments [Ref. l:p. 2-6]. This
interaction continues through subsequent phases and milestones
12
and can span several years for a classical acquisition program
[Ref. l:p. 2-7]. Figure 3 depicts the acquisition phases and
milestones.






















Figure 3 Acquisition Milestones and Phases, Source [Ref l:p.
2-1]
The acquisition phases provide a logical means to
progressively translate broadly stated mission needs into
well-defined system-specific requirements. The focus of these
activities is oriented and tailored to the establishment of
the minimum required accomplishments, program-specific exit
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criteria, and program objectives: "The acquisition strategy
shall be tailored to meet specific needs of individual
programs consistent with the policies established in DOD
Directive 5000.1" [Ref. 8:p.5-A-l].
At Milestone 0, the Mission Need Statement has been
approved to start a new program, signifying the beginning of
the Concept Exploration/Definition Phase (CE/D). Normally the
service component establishes a program office to develop,
produce, deploy, and support the new system. The Program
Manager (PM) selects alternative concepts and writes an
acquisition strategy to be pursued based upon Mission Area
Analysis, Mission Need Statement, and the Operational
Requirements Document. The program office evaluates
alternative concepts as to their potential life cycle cost,
development schedules, and performance characteristics. The
PM then selects the best concepts based upon their
feasibility, technical risk, and cost tradeoffs for additional
studies [Ref. 7:p. 11]. At this time, the PM should begin to
consider nondevelopmental alternatives.
A favorable decision at Milestone I, Concept Demonstration
Approval, marks the establishment of a new program Concept
Baseline. The Concept Baseline includes minimum performance
criteria outlined in the Operational Requirements Document and
includes cost and supportability constraints. Milestone I
approval allows the program to proceed to Phase I,
Demonstration and Validation (DEM/VAL).
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Some of the objectives of DEM/VAL are to define critical
design characteristics and to demonstrate critical processes
and technologies before proceeding into the next program
phase. It is during this phase that prototypes are usually
built and tested. A prototype is an original or model on
which a later item is formed or based.
The program proceeds to Milestone II, Developmental
Approval, once the Phase I exit criteria are met. Milestone
II establishes a Developmental Baseline. The Developmental
Baseline is a refinement of the Concept Baseline that it now
replaces. Program cost, schedule, and performance objectives
are approved for continuation into the next phase. Also,
Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) quantities are identified,
if applicable. LRIP is a limited production quantity designed
to establish an initial production base and to permit an
orderly increase in the production rate sufficient to lead to
full-rate production later [Ref. 9:p. B-ll]. LRIP is also a
good tool to measure the logistical support system before
going into full-rate production.
Upon successful completion of Milestone II, the program
inters the third phase, Phase II, Engineering and
Manufacturing Development (EMD). In this phase, the
system/equipment and the principle items necessary for its
support are fully developed, engineered, designed, and
fabricated. EMD translates the most promising design approach
into a stable, producible, cost effective system design.
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Manufacturing and production processes are demonstrated and
validated through a test and evaluation system [Ref. 8: p. 3-
21]. A program may inter Milestone III, Production and
Development, if the performance objectives are validated with
satisfactory test results and LRIP provides reasonable
assurance that the design is stable and capable of being
produced. A Production Baseline is established before
proceeding to the forth acquisition phase, Phase III,
Production and Development.
Phase III objectives are to establish an efficient
production and support base. The program should achieve an
operational capability that satisfies the mission need at this
point. Follow-on operational and production verification
testing are conducted to verify quality and to correct any
deficiencies [Ref. 8:p. 3-27].
Once the system is fielded, modifications may be required
because the threat changes, a deficiency is identified, or a
need to reduce operational costs. Approval of Milestone IV,
Major Modification Approval, means that a major modification
or system upgrade is approved for a system that is still being
produced. Now the program can enter the fifth phase, Phase
IV, Operations and Support. The objectives of this phase are
to support the fielded system, monitor system performance,
identify improvement opportunities, and modify the system as
required. The system remains in this phase until system
disposal is approved.
16
C. NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEM ACQUISITION
1 . General
Nondevelopmental item is a generic term that covers
materiel available from a wide variety of sources with little
or no development effort required by the Government [Ref. 4:
p. 1-3]. A simple definition of "Nondevelopmental Item" is
any item or equipment in which the user did not participate in
its development,
"
[Ref . 7: p. 20]. Nondevelopmental items are
those items already developed and are capable of fulfilling
requirements "as is" or with some "minor modification."
Title 10 (Section 2325) of the United States Code
describes the meaning of nondevelopmental item (Appendix B).
This statute includes any item in the commercial marketplace.
In addition, any existing item already developed by the
Services or other Government Agencies is considered an NDI.
Systems developed with foreign governments and the United
States are also considered nondevelopmental items.
The Army segregates nondevelopmental items into three
categories:
• Category A. Off-the-shelf items used in the
environment for which the items were designed
with little or no development required.
• Category B. Off-the-shelf items used in an
environment different from which the items were
designed.
• Category C. Integration of existing components
and essential engineering effort to accomplish
systems integration with research and development
to integrate the systems [Ref. 7:p. 8].
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NDIs are acquired primarily since they eliminate the
need for costly, time-consuming, development programs.
Nondevelopmental item acquisitions have lower life cycle costs
because NDIs can usually skip most of the research and
development phases of the acquisition process. Therefore, the
NDI acquisition process is shorter than the classical
acquisition approach because most or all of the research and
development phases are eliminated. In addition, legislation
is advocating the use of NDI acquisition alternatives. Title
10 (Section 2325) mandates the "preferential" use of
nondevelopmental items to satisfy requirements to the maximum
extent possible (Appendix B).
NDI acquisition covers a spectrum of materiel
alternatives since rapidly changing commercial technologies
expand the potential for high quality and low cost commercial
items to satisfy military requirements [Ref. 3:p. 4]. The
electronics and personal computer markets are good examples of
how high-tech and high quality items can be introduced and
upgraded within a very short time. These commercial
industries are able to introduce new technology rapidly
because they have developed their own independent research and
development capabilities.
These NDI markets provide opportunities for the
Government to reduce research and development costs since
these commercial industries are conducting their own research
18
and development programs. These concepts are used in other
markets as well. Therefore, NDI acquisitions offer many
possible solutions to materiel needs because of this broad
resource base.
2. Nondevelopmental Item Preference
Nondevelopmental item acquisition challenges the
traditional practice and cultural mindset of buying and
developing only military unique items. NDI acquisitions allow
for greater flexibility and lower life cycle costs in the
procurement process [Ref. 10 :p. 14]. The Department of
Defense can no longer afford to restrict the acquisition
process to military unique developmental efforts. Likewise,
NDI acquisition will not always be the optimum solution to
DOD's materiel needs. However, when NDI is the choice, DOD is
afforded the opportunity to tailor its needs, such as,
tailoring the logistical support structure for each NDI
acquisition. Nondevelopmental item acquisition, as a concept,
correlates to the movement of "commerciality" in the DOD
acquisition environment because NDI has opened the door to a
wide range of commercial alternatives to best meet the
Government's needs [Ref. 7: p. 15].
The Commission on Government Procurement emphasized
the need for a shift toward commercial product acquisition in
1972. IN 1976, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
directed Government Agencies to purchase commercial products
19
if they adequately satisfied the Government's needs. This
fundamental shift toward commercial products continued when
the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management
(Packard Commission) recommended that the Government make
greater use of commercial components, systems, and services
available "off-the-shelf" in 1986 [Ref. 10:p. 9].
The 1987 Preference Act also reinforced a preference
for nondevelopmental items and required the DOD to state
material requirements in terms of functions to be preformed,
performance required, and essential physical characteristics
[Ref. 4:p. 1-2]. The intention of this legislation was to
insure that NDI alternatives are given consideration as
solutions to materiel needs.
The Committee on Government Affairs stressed the need
for DOD to expand the use of commercially available products
and minimize research and development costs in 1989:
Too often, the Department of Defense continues
to subject commercially available parts to
complex military specifications and, as such,
requires contractors to reinvent a unique
military specification wheel when a
commercially available wheel can preform the
task just as well [Ref. 11: p.l].
The 1991 Defense Authorization Act required DOD to conduct
market research prior to developing new specifications to
determine if nondevelopmental items are available to
identified needs. This measure was implemented to stimulate
the use of nondevelopmental item alternatives instead of
developing a unique military product [Ref. 10:p. 10].
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3. Classical Acquisition Versus NDI Acquisition
On average, an NDI acquisition cycle takes two and
one-half to five years, while classical research and
development cycles take eight to sixteen years, as depicted in
Figure 4 [Ref. 7: p. 7]. NDI acquisition saves time in the
acquisition process because the Demonstration and Validation
and Engineering and Manufacturing phases can be combined or
eliminated. A four to nine year cycle can be compressed into
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Figure 4 Acquisition Life Cycle Model, Source [Ref. 7:p. 25]
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The second phase (DEM/VAL) of the acquisition process
can be skipped because the commercial developer has usually
conducted design, research and development, integration,
logistical support, and test and evaluation efforts. Time in
phase three (EMD) may be reduced even if some item
modification is required to meet a military requirement. In
this case, the developer must only demonstrate the
capabilities of the NDI modification. Thus scheduling,
testing, and production are more certain than under a
classical acquisition program [Ref. 7: p. 25].
4. Advantages of Nondevelopmental Acquisition
Nondevelopmental item acquisition capitalizes on the
use of commercial "state-of-the-art" technologies while
providing DOD with effective and economical solutions to
operational requirements. NDI acquisitions offer quick
responses to operational needs because they have shorter
acquisition cycles [Ref. 10: P. 12]. Testing requirements may
be reduced because some of the commercial manufacturer's test
and performance data can be used to prove military
suitability.
Another advantage for using nondevelopmental item
acquisition is that NDI has shown quality trends to be as good
if not better than specially developed items when they are
purchased to meet a military requirement [Ref. 12: p. 5].
22
NDI acquisitions tend to have lower life cycle costs
because of the limited R&D costs, use of commercial
specifications, and competition in the commercial market.
Many studies have shown that competitive pressures lead
directly to lower system prices. Additionally, NDIs are
uniquely structured to take advantage of the competitive
forces in the market place because the Government becomes
another buyer in a market with many suppliers [Ref. 7: p. 23].
Many PMs prefer nondevelopmental items because they
are able to project funding requirements more accurately when
nondevelopmental items are part of the acquisition strategy.
Theoretically, off-the-shelf prices are firm. Therefore, the
program manager may project a schedule and a budget with
minimum risk of being wrong [Ref. 7:p. 24].
5. Disadvantages of Nondevelopmental Acquisition
Each nondevelopmental item acquisition must have an
individual support strategy and be incorporated into the
acquisition strategy early on. Acquisition planning must
ensure that logistics and support concerns are satisfied
before a decision is made to buy commercial products.
Nondevelopmental item acquisition is not without potential
problems and risk.
Some major problems concern configuration control and
obsolescence. These problems can be associated with rapidly
changing technologies like electronic items. New products can
23
be introduced and discontinued in a short time. Therefore,
NDI product configuration information often lags behind or
falls victim to obsolescence which makes management of
configuration integration difficult [Ref. 13 :p. 5].
Sustainability problems can arise if repair parts and
replacement items are not compatible with existing systems or
support systems. If repair parts and replacement items are
not interchangeable, additional spares and replacement parts
will have to be introduced into the support system.
Inadequate market research may result in the failure
of the product to meet performance or logistical support
requirements. The market survey identifies a material
alternative that is "good enough," not necessarily the best
product [Ref. 14 :p. 10]. As more and larger modifications are
required, the intended benefits may rapidly disappear and the
cost savings are lost [Ref. 12: p. 4].
Design stability is a another concern because much of
the research and development effort is conducted by the
commercial developer. As discussed earlier, many high-tech
electronic products can be introduced into the marketplace
very rapidly. Test and evaluation of the design could be
incomplete because of the pressures to get the product into
the market before a competitor does.
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6. Examples of Nondevelopmental Items
There are a number of examples of nondevelopmental
item acquisitions. Figure 5 depicts how NDI cost and schedule
benefits diminish as the degree of modification increases.
The simplest NDI starts with off-the-shelf items and increases
in complexity to full scale development. The Army's Beretta
9mm pistol is an example of an "off-the-shelf" item. The Air
Force's KC-10 aircraft is an example of a "ruggedization
item." A ruggedized or militarized item is usually operated
in an environment different than its original design. The
Army's Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) is an example of
subsystem and component integration. The Army's Forward Area
Air Defense System (FAADS) Avenger is an example of
development with NDI piece parts [Ref. 10 :p. 11]. The PATRIOT
air defense missile system is an example of a classical or
full development program.
The predominant use of nondevelopmental items is
related to the insertion of an NDI subsystem, component, and
piece part levels in major developmental efforts [Ref. 4:p. 2-
3]. There are many commercial market areas that are well
suited for nondevelopmental item acquisitions: computers,
power generation, test measurement equipment, transportation
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Figure 5 Development and Time Costs, Source [Ref. 10 :p. 126]
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter discussed the differences between classical
acquisition and NDI acquisition strategies. Classical
research and development programs take much longer than NDI
programs to field. NDI programs are fielded much faster
because most of the development phases are eliminated. Thus,
testing and production can begin much sooner. In addition,
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NDI programs are less expensive because development costs are
saved. Chapter III will discuss NDI support methods.
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III. NDI LOGISTICAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter II described the theoretical framework for the
acquisition of nondevelopmental items. This chapter explores
the potential benefits of using Nondevelopmental Item (NDI)
Acquisition and addresses special support considerations for
nondevelopmental systems.
It is important to understand the NDI support methods and
how they are applied. The entire process of planning and
acquiring logistical support must be tailored to the
constraints inherent in the nondevelopmental item being
supported. The Logistical Support Analysis is an important
tool that can used identify support requirements and
constraints of a system. This analysis helps design the
Integrated Logistical Support Plan that is the Government's
formal logistic support planning document for a program. Much
of a program's success in the operational phase is dependent
upon the quality of the support analysis and support planning.
Too often, inadequate support plans cause increased operating
costs.
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B. INTEGRATED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT (ILS)
According to DOD Directive 5000.39, "Acquisition and
Support Management of Integrated Logistical Support for
Systems and Equipment," Integrated Logistical Support is a
disciplined, unified, and iterative approach to the management
and technical activities necessary to:
• Integrate support considerations into system and
equipment design.
• Develop support requirements that are related
consistently to readiness objectives, to design, and to
each other.
• Acquire the required support.
• Provide the required support during the operational phase
at minimum cost [Ref. 9:p. 1-1].
The Program Manager is assigned the responsibility to
establish and manage an adequately funded ILS program. ILS
policy emphasizes readiness (a system's capability to perform
its wartime mission) implications early during system
development. Therefore, the early identification of readiness
and supportability design parameters is necessary to achieve
system readiness objectives at an affordable cost [Ref. 9:p.
1-1].
The ILS program will address the impact of support costs
upon the total system cost, known as the Life Cycle Cost
(LCC). LCC includes research and development costs,
production and construction costs, operational and maintenance
costs, system retirement and phase out costs. All these
factors influence the maintenance concept and logistical
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support for the system. The concept chosen to meet the
operational requirement locks in approximately 70 percent of
a system's LCC during the operational phase [Ref. 9:p. 6-4].
NDI programs are constrained because they do not have any
input into system design. The commercial developer's
decisions during the design process may restrict the
program's support options.
C. INTEGRATED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PLAN (ILSP)
"The 'Acquisition Strategy' is the program manager's plan
for satisfying the user's need," [Ref. 7: p. 13]. The
acquisition strategy must make effective use of available
financial, technological, and commercial resources. NDI
support factors include the maintenance concept for the entire
system that capitalizes on existing facilities and equipment
and incentives for commercial repair to minimize cost if
applicable.
The Integrated Logistical Support Plan (ILSP) is a key
factor in successfully fielding and supporting a system [Ref.
7:p. 14]. The ILSP covers all the logistic activities for the
life of the system. The Integrated Logistical Support Plan
should provide for a smooth transition of support
responsibility from contractor to organic support, if
applicable [Ref. 8: p. 7-A-2-4]. The parameters used in
determining support resource requirements are traceable to
program objectives and thresholds presented in the acquisition
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strategy [Ref. 8:p. 7-A-2-3]. Therefore, the ILSP should
reflect the NDI's support strategy.
D. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT STRATEGIES FOR NDI
There are four methods that can be used to provide
logistical support for nondevelopmental items:
• No support required.
• Total contractor support.
• Organic support
.
• A combination of organic and contractor support.
The decision regarding the support method should be made
as early as possible in the life of the program so that the
contracts may be structured to facilitate the required system
support [Ref. 7:.p. 40]. The support methods and their
advantages and disadvantages are presented below.
1. No Support (NS)
This support method works by not repairing equipment
regardless of the type of failure. Instead, the item is
replaced with a spare when it fails. Items designated to
receive this method of support are called "non-repairable
items" [Ref. 7:p. 40]. Choosing this support method implies
that the cost of spare units and disposal is cheaper than
repairing the system to a ready for use condition [Ref. 9: p.
16-2]. Also, the components used to make the system are
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usually low cost items which justifies disposal (when they
fail)
.
A non-repairable system is normally modular in
construction with easily removable sub-components. Fault
detection and isolation of failed components should be easy
because the user discards the system after it fails.
Therefore, a self test capability is important. The self test
should be thorough and confirm failures before discarding the
system or this could be expensive [Ref. 7: p. 40].
a . Advantages
The no support method offers some advantages
because this method requires minimal logistical support.
Lower level spare parts are not required because the entire
unit is replaced. The only maintenance test equipment
required is limited to initial system check-out and ready-for-
use certification. In addition, there is no need for internal
accessibility, test points, plug-in sub-assemblies, or
maintainability enhancements. Therefore, low personnel
maintenance skills are required because maintenance actions
are limited to removal and replacement functions (for example,
removal and replacement of an inexpensive circuit card).
b. Disadvantages
The decision to implement this support concept
should consider its effects during conflicts and peacetime
environments. If the system is not to be discarded upon
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failure during wartime, other support concepts should be
considered. It could be difficult to set up a different
support system during a conflict. New items, new maintenance
equipment, and maintenance training would be required to
implement a new support system. To minimize these potential
difficulties, a total discard upon failure system should be
used in peacetime, as well as wartime [Ref. 7:p. 42].
There are also other areas of concern. Inventory
stock levels for replacement spare units/systems must still be
maintained for rapid replacement. Additionally, repair would
be difficult because replacement parts are not stocked.
Further, transportation time requirements could also affect
the replenishment of inventory stock during times of high
demand. Finally, if inventory replenishment lags behind
inventory demand requirements, stockade levels will fall or
zero out. This causes inadequacies in the support system,
which could be critical in wartime environments.
2. Total Contractor Support (TCS)
Total Contractor Support involves establishing
contractual responsibility for all system maintenance with a
commercial contractor. The Government simply notifies the
contractor if an item fails and the contractor is responsible
for restoring the item to working order. Total contractor
support is more applicable for systems operating in a non-
combat environment because the repairs are normally conducted
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at the contractor's facility far from combat locations [Ref.
9:p. 16-4].
There are some common characteristics with equipment
that is best supported by total contractor support. TCS will
work well for items that are too expensive to discard upon
failure and when other support methods are not practicable
(e.g., additional personnel required or too expensive to set
up) [Ref. 7:p. 42]. Total contractor support may also be
appropriate in systems where the relative frequency of failure
is low.
a. Advantages
By using TCS, the contractor assumes the risk for
any failures during the contract period. Other advantages are
that the Government would not require tools and test equipment
because the contractor provides ready-for-use certification
and performs all repairs [Ref. 9: p. 16-3]. Inventory systems
are reliable because spare units can be stored on site or at
contractor facilities. Also, military maintenance personnel
requirements can be reduced since the contractor does all the
repair work.
Contractor support may be the best option
in high technology areas where maintaining
state-of-the-art is critical, e.g., computers
and associated software. The Air Force has
found traditional methods of logistical
support are not appropriate for their
commercial computer systems. The proliferation
and exponential growth of commercial computer
systems in the Air Force demand support
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techniques that are prompt and maintenance
effective without being cost prohibitive. The
Navy has experienced a similar change. [Ref.
7: p. 44].
h. Disadvantages
Total dependency upon the contractor means
accepting possible risks in excessive maintenance costs,
quality instability (internal design changes and substitute
components), untimely and inadequate support (if too far from
repair facilities), and system upgrades that may not be
compatible with existing equipment [Ref. 7: p. 44]. If the
system has a high failure rate, then the maintenance costs
will increase because more repairs are required. Thus, the
price for this type of support can be considerable. This
support system is transportation intensive in order to
replenish spare system inventories and repair/return systems
to the users. Delays may be experienced in these areas
because the contractor's repair facilities may not be located
near the users' locations. The program manger must consider
these impacts on these logistical areas when this support
method is chosen [Ref. 15 :p. 112].
3. Organic Support (OS)
Organic Support for a military organization implies
that the organization has the internal resources in place and
the required maintenance skills to operate their own support
systems. The organization performs all maintenance tasks on
the system. Normally, the organization identifies maintenance
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problems, repairs/replaces systems, maintains spare parts and
spare system inventories. Historically, the DOD has used
organic support for most systems and equipment:
Traditional logistics presupposes that
organic support is the mandatory option.
Again, this may be true for some systems and
generally can be accomplished for all systems
if cost is not a consideration. But
realistically, DOD managers must recognize
efficient and effective support depends upon
their ability to influence system design and
parts selection. Otherwise, we accept the
risk of costly sole source parts supply,
including maintenance manuals and testing
equipment of costly acquisition, if available,
of technical data and a system design freeze
to a baseline with additional costs to
maintain the production base [Ref. 7:p. 46].
Organic support is organized into three levels of
maintenance: organizational, intermediate, and depot
maintenance. Organizational level maintenance is conducted by
the activity (organization) which actually uses the equipment,
within the activity's capability. Maintenance is limited to
equipment performance checks, external adjustments, and
removal or replacement of some components. The least skilled
personnel are assigned to these tasks.
Intermediate maintenance is performed by mobile, semi-
mobile, and/or specialized organizations and installations.
At this level, tasks may include repair of end items by
removal or replacement of major assemblies, modules, or piece
parts. Additional test and support equipment and more spares
are required. Intermediate level maintenance personnel perform
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more detailed maintenance tasks than organizational level
personnel
.
Depot maintenance is the highest level of maintenance
because it supports the accomplishment of tasks above the
capabilities of intermediate and organizational levels. The
depot may be a specialized repair facility supporting many
systems and may be the manufacturer's plant. These facilities
are fixed installations and can handle bulky equipment and
large numbers of spare parts. Depot level maintenance is
capable of complete overhauling, rebuilding, and calibration
of equipment [Ref. 15:p. 116].
a . Advantages
The initial investment for OS can be very large
because the Government may need to build facilities and buy
repair equipment. However, OS may be less expensive and more
effective in the long run for NDIs. Organizational support
has the infrastructure to support systems that have high
failure rates and large populations [Ref. 7:p. 45]. Large
volume inventory capabilities, repair skills and repair
equipment, and military transportation assets enable OS to
support these high demands regularly. Moreover, organic
support is better suited for combat environments because
maintenance operations and organizations are located near
combat units. In addition, if a system is needed for some
future application, the Government may choose to develop the
37
organic support capability. Some of the existing support
capabilities and facilities could then be utilized, thereby,
reducing the time required to develop a new support program.
Jb. Disadvantages
By using Organic Support, the Government develops
the complete support program and solely bears the risk for
system failure [Ref. 9:p. 16-4]. Additionally, the Government
may need to obtain technical data for the system to design a
logistical support system. This information determines the
number of spare components and spare parts, and maintenance
skill requirements [Ref. 9: p. 7-9]. This type of requirement
would need sufficient operational or historical reliability
and maintainability data to justify the initial investment.
Another consideration is that the system has to be repairable
or offer some salvage value. NDIs have a shorter acquisition
cycle and therefore, usually require interim support before
organic support methods can be designed and implemented [Ref.
7:p. 45],
4. Organic Contractor Mix (Mix)
The Organic and Contractor Mix support method combines
elements of the two previously discussed methods. The Mix
method involves the sharing of system failure between the
Government and the contractor. Maintenance responsibilities
may be shared in any manner that is beneficial to the
Government. Usually the Government assumes the organizational
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maintenance tasks and the contractor assumes the depot
maintenance functions [Ref. 7:p. 47].
a. Advantages
The Mix support method is best suited for systems
that do not fall into the non-repairable category and are not
best served by total contractor support. This support method
would be more applicable to long life cycle items not subject
to rapid state-of-the-art technology changes [Ref. 7:p. 47].
A system requiring a phased support system could
be considered for a Mix method. Phased support allows a
program to design the support structure incrementally,
according to the availability of maintenance assets. A
program choosing organic support may require time develop the
required support assets. Initial support would be provided
by the contractor until the system transitions to organic
support or to a Mix [Ref. 7:p. 48].
b. Disadvantages
A significant concern of using a Mix support
concept is controlling the transition from a particular
support method to another method. The requirements between
the Government and the contractor (if used) must be clearly
defined and understood by all parties. Misunderstandings
could cause scheduling delays and increase costs.
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E. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ANALYSIS FOR NDIs
Logistical Support Analysis (LSA) is an iterative
analytical process by which logistical support necessary for
a new system is identified and evaluated. LSA is a part of
the systems engineering process that ensures that system
design and supportability reguirements are integrated early in
the system. As a design analysis tool, it is employed
throughout the early phases of system development and often
includes maintenance analysis. The guantitative methods of
LSA have applications in the following areas:
• Initial determination and establishment of
logistics criteria as an input to system design.
• Evaluation of design alternatives.
• Assessment identification and provisioning
logistic support elements.
• Final assessment of system support capabilities.
An output of LSA is the identification and justification
for logistic support resources: spare/repair part types and
guantities, test and test support eguipment, and personnel
skill-level reguirements. This output is called the Logistic
Support Analysis Record (LSAR) [Ref. 15: p. 14]. The LSAR is
a formal tool under MIL-STD 1388-2A to document operations and
maintenance reguirements. The LSAR is the basis for training,
personnel, supply provisioning, support eguipment acguisition,
facility construction, and maintenance tasks.
The following logistical support elements should be














Reliability is the probability that a system or
product will perform in a satisfactory manner for a given time
when used under the specified operating conditions. This
definition stresses the elements of probability, satisfactory
performance, time and specified operating conditions. These
four elements are extremely important because each plays a




Probability is usually stated as a quantitative
expression representing a fraction of a percent signifying the
number of times that an event occurs (successes), divided by
the total number of trials. For example, a statement that the
probability of survival of an item for 80 hours is 0.75. (or
75 percent) indicates that we can expect that item will
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function properly for at least 80 hours, 75 times out of 100
trials [Ref. 15:p .14].
When there are several supposedly identical items
operating under similar conditions, it can be expected that
failures will occur at different points in time. Thus,
failures are described in probabilistic terms. The
fundamental definition of reliability is heavily dependent
upon the concepts derived from probability theory [Ref. 15: p.
15] .
2>. Satisfactory Performance
Satisfactory performance suggests that specific
criteria must be established which describe what is considered
satisfactory system operation. A combination of qualitative
and quantitative factors defining the functions that the
system is to accomplish, usually presented in the context of
a system specification, are required [Ref. 15:p. 15].
c. Mission Time
Mission time is an important element since it
represents a measure against which the degree of system
performance can be related. One must know the "time"
parameter in order to find the probability of completing a
mission or a given function as scheduled. Of particular
interest is being able to predict the probability of a system
surviving (without failing) for a designated period. Also,
reliability is frequently defined in terms of mean time
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between failure (MTBF) and mean time between maintenance
(MTBM) [Ref. 15:p. 15].
MTBF is a basic technical measure of reliability.
MTBF is the total functional life of a population of an item
divided by the total number of failures within the population,
for a particular interval. This definition holds true for
time, rounds, miles, events, or other measures of life units
[Ref. 15:p. 18].
MTBM is the mean or average time between all
maintenance actions (corrective and preventive). Corrective
maintenance includes all unscheduled maintenance actions
performed as the result of a system failure, to restore the
system to a specified condition. These actions include
failure identification, repair and replacement, checkouts, and
condition verification. Preventive maintenance includes all
scheduled maintenance actions performed to retain a system in
a specified condition. Preventive actions include periodic
inspections, critical item replacements, and calibration [Ref.
15:p. 18].
d. Specified Conditions
Specified conditions may include several
environmental factors such as geographical location,
operational profile, transportation profile, temperature
cycles, and humidity. These factors must not only address the
condition for the period when the system is operating, but
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also the conditions when the system is in a storage mode or
being transported from one location to the next. Experience
has shown that the transportation, handling, and the storage
modes are sometimes more critical from a reliability
standpoint than the conditions experienced during the actual
system operational use [Ref. 15: p. 15].
These four elements are critical in determining
the reliability of an NDI system. System reliability is a key
factor in the freguency of maintenance, and the maintenance
freguency obviously has a significant impact on logistical
support reguirements. Reliability predictions and analyses
are reguired as an input to the LSA. Reliability is an
inherent characteristic of design. Recall, NDI does not have
input into system design. As such, it is essential that
reliability be addressed throughout the system life cycle
[Ref. 15:p. 15].
2. Availability
Availability is often used as a measure of system
readiness, i,e., the degree, percent, of probability that a
system will be ready or available when reguired for use. It
is the probability that the system is operating satisfactorily
at any point in time when used under stated conditions, where
the total time considered includes operating time, active
repair time, administrative time, and logistics time. This is
often called "operational readiness." [Ref. 15:p. 69].
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Operational readiness affects the number of spares and spare
parts required to reduce repair times. Therefore, the NDI
support method must consider availability requirements.
3 . Maintainability
Maintainability is an inherent characteristic of a
system design, like reliability. Maintainability pertains to
the ease, accuracy, safety, and economy in the performance of
maintenance actions. A system should be designed such that it
can be maintained without large investments of time, cost, or
other resources (e.g., personnel, facilities, materials, test
equipment) and without affecting the mission of that system.
Maintainability is the ability of an item to be maintained,
whereas maintenance constitutes a series of actions to be
taken to restore or retain an item in effective operational
state. Maintainability is a design parameter. Therefore,
maintainability is a result of design [Ref. 15:p. 17]. The
system determines the maintainability requirements, not the
support method. Thus, an NDI program must analyze
maintainability requirements before choosing a support method.
Maintainability can also be defined as a
characteristic of design that can be expressed in terms of
maintenance frequency factors, maintenance times, and
maintenance cost or a combination of factors, such as:
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• A characteristic of design installation which is
expressed as a probability that an item will be retained
in or restored to a specified condition within a given
period, when maintenance is performed in accordance with
prescribed procedures and resources.
• A characteristic of design and installation which is
expressed as the probability that maintenance will not be
required more than x times in a given period, when
maintenance is performed in accordance with prescribed
procedures and resources. This may be analogous to
reliability when the latter deals with the overall
frequency of maintenance.
• A characteristic of design and installation which is
expressed as the probability a system is maintained in
accordance with prescribed procedures [Ref. 15 :p. 17].
Maintainability requires the consideration of many
different factors involving all aspects of the system, and the
measures of maintainability often include a combination of the
these factors.
a. Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM)
MTBM is the mean or average time between all
maintenance actions, corrective and preventive, which was
discussed earlier. It includes consideration of reliability
MTBF and Mean Time Between Repair (MTBR) . The maintenance
frequency factor, MTBM, is a major parameter in determining
system availability and overall effectiveness [Ref. 15: p. 48].
b. Mean Time Between Repair (MTBR)
MTBR is a factor of MTBM, and refers to the mean
time between item replacement and is a major parameter in
deciding spare part requirements. A maintainability objective
in system design is to maximize MTBR where feasible. Often,
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corrective and preventive maintenance actions are accomplished
without generating a requirement for replacement part. In
other instances, item replacement is required, which
necessitates the availability of a spare part and an NDI
inventory requirement [Ref. 15 :p. 49].
c. Logistic Delay Time (LDT)
LDT is the maintenance downtime expected as a
result of waiting for spare parts to become available, waiting
for the availability of test equipment required to perform
maintenance, waiting for transportation, waiting to use a
facility required for maintenance, and so on. LDT does not
include active maintenance time. It is a major element of
total maintenance downtime and could be significant for NDIs
[Ref. 15:p. 48].
d. Administrative Delay Time (ADT)
ADT refers to that portion of downtime during
which maintenance is delayed for reasons of an administrative
nature: personnel assignment, labor strike, organizational
constraint, etc. ADT does not include active maintenance time
[Ref. 15:p. 49].
e. Maintenance Downtime (MDT)
Maintenance downtime is the total elapsed time
required (when a system is not operational) to repair and
restore a system to full operating status, and/or to retain a
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system in that condition. MDT includes mean active
maintenance time, LDT, and ADT [Ref. 15 :p .47].
4. Standardization
The Government may purchase several different systems
to meet the same needs of different organizations when relying
upon the commercial market. For example, consider the purchase
of an office typewriter. Many commercial firms manufacture
typewriters. If a Government organization had a reguirement
for one, it would not develop it from a typical research and
development approach. Instead, the organization would buy
directly from the manufacturer to save unnecessary research
and development costs. Unless the organization specified some
level of compatibility with existing typewriters, they may end
up buying a model that is not compatible with typewriters
currently in use. This causes a logistical support problem
because the agency would have to stock at least two different
types of ribbons for the different typewriters [Ref. 15: p.
30] .
Hardware and software proliferation is one area of NDI
where systems must be compatible and interchangeable of
readiness can be affected. Standardization of eguipment
should be an important consideration because of the impact
upon spare part inventories. A Form, Fit, Function (F 3 )
analysis can be a valuable tool because requirements can be
evaluated in functional terms, such as, speed, range, weight,
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and other characteristics [Ref. 7:p. 30]. In addition, an F3
analysis can enable NDIs to support multiple systems having
the same or similar performance requirements. Therefore,
standardization would be promoted and reduce the need for the
logistical support system to carry several different groups of
spare parts to support these items.
5. System Use
The degree of militarization affects the potential
benefits of an NDI acquisition. As the military version
differs more and more from the commercial version, the
benefits of NDI diminish. Military modifications could mean
an increase in system complexity and cost. Additional tests
could be required which can also increase cost and delay the
fielding schedule. As the degree of militarization increases,
the need for an organic support system increases [Ref. 7: p.
33] .
6. System Environment
The environment that the nondevelopmental item
operates in is important. This factor can be divided into two
categories: hostile and benign. If the NDI system is to be
used in direct combat operations, a total contractor support
system may be very difficult to implement. The contractor
would be brought into a combat environment to provide service.
However, contractor maintenance service is possible if systems
can be moved from the battlefield to a more benign environment
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[Ref. 7: p. 51]. A benign environment favors total contractor
support. The cost of this service in a benign environment
would not include the cost of training support personnel in
combat techniques. However, combat training may be a part of
the cost for organic support. The closer this environment is
to the commercial environment, the more DOD can rely on
commercial support as an option [Ref. 7:p. 33].
7. System Operating Cycle
Usually, long operating cycles for systems indicates
a mission of a routine and ongoing nature. For systems that
fall into this category, service cycles can be planned in
advance, which makes total contractor support easier for all
systems than with systems with short cycles. Short operating
cycles usually suggest intermittent, randomly scheduled
missions. In addition, these systems tend to spend a great
deal to time in stand-by status. For these systems, support
services cannot be conveniently scheduled in advance.
Therefore, systems with short operating cycles are better
served with an organic system [Ref. 7: p. 51].
8. System Maintenance Level
This factor describes the level of maintenance where
most system repair will occur. A no support system is favored
when most of the maintenance actions are expended at the
organizational level. For repairable systems that require
higher levels of maintenance, like intermediate or depot level
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for repairs, some level of support is required. A mix support
system may be preferred if the system is mostly repaired at
the intermediate and depot levels. If most of the repairs
were at the intermediate level, the Government would develop
an organic intermediate level capability and contract the
depot level maintenance [Ref. 7:p. 53].
9. System Cost
Two broad categories segregate life cycle costs. They
are recurring and non-recurring costs. Recurring costs are
those life cycle costs attributable to individual systems
because each system has its own operational and support
costs. In turn, each system procured increases the
operational and support costs associated with that system.
These costs and maintenance costs will affect the NDI support
method [Ref. 15:p. 35].
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter addressed the potential benefits of using
nondevelopmental item acquisition and the support
considerations for nondevelopmental systems. The support
method selected must be tailored to the constraints inherent
in the nondevelopmental item being supported. The Logistical
Support Analysis is an important tool that can be used to
identify NDI support requirements and constraints of a system.
This analysis helps design the Integrated Logistical Support
Plan for an NDI program.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT NDI PROGRAM SUPPORT STRATEGIES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines current support strategies of four
Nondevelopmental Item/System (NDI) acquisitions. NDI
logistical support strategies from several different major
nondevelopmental item acquisitions were researched. Four
nondevelopmental items were selected based upon life-cycle
costs and the support strategy selected. The four NDI
programs were: AN/ARN-148 Omega Navigational System, Secure
Telephone Unit III, AN/PSS-12 Mine Detector, and the AN/PSN
Precision GPS Receiver. Table 1 depicts the NDI programs
researched.
Sources included DOD official documents and telephone
interviews with a sampling of current U.S. Army Program
Managers (PMs) and logisticians for their insight on
nondevelopmental acquisition strategies. Program acquisition
strategies and logistical support plans were analyzed to
determine if they complement each other and the rationale
behind selecting the support method chosen. Annex C lists
























SOURCE: Developed By Researcher
B . BACKGROUND
As discussed earlier, NDI alternatives usually require a
departure from traditional support methods. Each NDI
acquisition should consider possible support strategies early
in the planning process. Mission requirements heavily
influence the type of logistics support required.
The service component also greatly influences the support
concept decision. The Air Force, Navy, and Army may have
different mission and support requirements for the same or
similar nondevelopmental item. The entire process of planning
for and acquiring logistical support must be tailored to the
constraints inherent in the nondevelopmental item being
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supported. Too often, an inadequate support plan caused
increased operating costs. For example,
The LOGMARS system in the NAVY expanded to the
point that TCS [Total Contractor Support] was
too expensive. By changing the support MIX of
organic and contractor support and having the
contractor charge for the repair on a per-
incident basis, the NAVY reduced its annual
budget for LOGMARS from $590,000 to $163,000
[Ref. 7:p. 44].
Recall, there are four basic ways to support a system: No
Support (NS) required, Total Contractor Support (TCS),
Contractor/Organic Support (MIX), and Organic Support (OS).
Historically, the Department of Defense uses organic support
for most systems and equipment. Regardless which support
method is chosen, the advantages and disadvantages should not
be overlooked.
C. ANALYSIS OF NDI PROGRAMS
The following NDI programs will be analyzed in these
areas: acquisition strategy, support strategy, advantages and
disadvantages of the support strategy, and potential support
problems.
1. AN/ARN-148 Omega Navigational System (ONS)
The AN/ARN-148 Omega Navigational System is a state-
of-the-art navigational system for aircraft which combines
microprocessor technology with a digital receiver design. The
ONS comes equipped with a Control Display Unit (CDU), a fully
alphanumeric keyboard, and a color display. The Omega
54
Navigational System detects navigational beacon signals,
performs the navigation computations, and presents the
information to the operator on the CDU. The ONS may also be
interfaced with other aircraft systems (Heading, True
Airspeed, and Autopilot). The system uses Built-in-Test
(BIT) equipment to detect 95 percent of failures. The system
dimensions are 4.9 inches Width x 7.5 inches Height x 16.1
inches Length and weighs 18.2 pounds.
a. Acquisition Strategy
The acquisition strategy and the logistic support
plan for the ONS were combined in a document known as the
"Draft Transition Plan for the AN/ARN 148 Omega Set" [Ref.
16:p. 1-16]. This document included the acquisition strategy,
fielding plans, support requirements, and support plans.
The acquisition strategy for the ONS started as
part of a Product Improvement Program (PIP). In 1986, the CH-
47 Project Manager Office was tasked by the Secretary of the
Army to incorporate long range navigation aides as part of a
PIP [Ref.3:p. 5]. The Army conducted tests on navigational
aide equipment with CH-47 helicopters in 1979. The Army's
goal was to improve the long range self-deployment
capabilities of selected helicopters. The Army decided the
acquisition strategy would be to procure an off-the-shelf
commercial navigation system and use a lifetime total
contractor support concept. The program office conducted a
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market survey to identify qualified companies and awarded the
contract in 1986. The Army conducted acceptance tests and
flight safety tests before fielding the ONS in 1988. The Army
informed the other Services about the Omega Navigational
System and the ONS became a joint service program with the
Army managing the program in 1987. A total of 359 Omega
systems and 119 ONS Data Loader systems were procured at a
cost of $8,297,590. The ONS unit cost was $13,700.
One advantage of this acquisition strategy was
that the Army knew there were commercially available
navigation aids from previous test efforts (conducted in
1979). These test systems were used in the same manner as the
commercially available systems and did not require
modifications. Thus, the PM was able to tailor the
acquisition strategy to commercial requirement specifications
because no military specifications existed.
Also, the Army intended to buy a small quantity of
systems (359) and did not wish to incur the expenses involved
in a full development program. Time to delivery was another
consideration. A traditional development program could take
as long as eight to sixteen years before fielding any
equipment. An NDI acquisition could be fielded much quicker.
b. Support Method
The ONS used a total contractor support concept.
Under this support concept, repair of major components and
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sub-components were performed by the contractor at the
contractor's facilities. The user removed nonoperational
units and shipped them directly to the contractor. Spare
replaceable units were maintained at the contractor's
facilities until there was a requirement to replace a system.
The contractor then shipped the replaceable unit to the user
with a guaranteed delivery of not more than twenty-four hours.
The ONS included built-in-test capability to detect faults and
a one-year warranty. In wartime environments, military
aircraft will be used to facilitate delivery.
The first maintenance contract was for three years
at a cost of $56,750. Currently, the program is under a
interim support contract and has obligated $206,100 in funds
to cover the cost of maintenance support and additional spares
for two years.
According to the interviews conducted, the program
office chose this support concept because it was simple,
responsive, and supported the acquisition strategy. The
concept was simple because the contractor was responsible for,
and performed, all the maintenance work. The program office
was pleased with the responsiveness of the contractor because
the contractor could meet the twenty-four-hour spare
replacement requirement. Another reason for using total
contractor support was that the ONS had a very low failure
rate (exact figures not provided) and was not maintenance
intensive.
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c. Potential Logistical Support Problems
Potential support problems included
transportation of spares during wartime and the possibility of
the contractor going out of business (although this is not
likely). In wartime, there could be an initial lag in
switching from commercial transportation to military
transportation. Therefore, the project office should insure
that deploying units (during conflicts) carry enough spares to
cover this contingency.
Market research revealed that other commercial
vendors were available as potential backup sources for
providing similar systems. However, these systems may be hard
to integrate into the helicopters and function in the same
manner as the ONS. In addition, the logistical burden would
increase due to the requirement to support two different
navigation systems at once. Making sure the correct spares
went to the correct locations and to the correct aircraft
could be a major problem.
2. Secure Telephone Unit (STU) III
The Future Secure Voice System (FSVS) featured a
family of user friendly, economical, and secure telephone
equipment, for widespread application. The STU III was one
of these FSVS systems. Units passed secure voice through a
cryptographic device located in the terminal. In addition,
the STU III was designed to the same standards as a
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conventional office phone and operated over Public Telephone
Systems and the Defense Switched Network (DSN).
a. Acquisition Strategy
The acquisition strategy was developed from
National Security Agency (NSA) requirements and the results of
market surveys that identified promising nondevelopmental
alternatives. NDI alternatives were promising because the
user's requirement called for a secure communication device to
pass voice and facsimile information over conventional
telephone lines. Market surveys revealed several commercially
available secure communication devices. However, these
commercial products did not meet NSA secure cryptographic
requirements.
The PM solved this problem by using a Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) cryptographic device to meet NSA
requirements. Incorporation of the military cryptographic
device was the only difference between the STU III equipment
and the commercially available secure office phone equipment.
The PM split the buy among three vendors. This
strategy enabled the program to obtain equipment in a timely
manner, introduce the latest technology without integration
problems, and insure a fair price through competition. System
integration was not a problem because any unit can be replaced
from any vender and still communicate with any other system.
This application would not work if the cryptographic devices
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were not GFE. Thus, no problems were reported from
integrating new equipment designs with existing equipment. In
addition, the GFE was utilized to meet NSA security
requirements. Sixty thousand STU Ills were bought at a cost
of $119,700,000. The average unit cost was $1,995.
The respondents indicated that the major
advantage of this NDI program was that multiple sources (three
vendors) were used to expand the resource base. Therefore,
fair and reasonable prices ($1,995 unit cost) could be
maintained through competition.
Jb. Support Method
The STU III used a contractor/organic support
concept. Here, depot level designated maintenance
(repair/return) was performed through the original equipment
manufacturer. For those items identified as user replaceable
parts (e.g., handset, powercord, etc.), maintenance repair was
conducted by the operator [Ref. 17: p. 3]. Therefore, the
equipment was returned to operational use with minimum
downtime. Nonoperational units were sent from the user to the
Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, a Government owned/contractor
operated (GOCO) facility. The depot would conduct a simple
operational check to determine if the equipment was
nonoperational . Elaborate test equipment was not required for
this test. The STU Ills were simply plugged into a commercial
telephone jack and power supply to determine if the unit was
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nonoperational. If the unit was nonoperational, it was
returned to the manufacturer for repair. The depot was
responsible for overall stock and issue of STU Ills spares.
Warranties ranged from 12-24 months and contractor repairs
were limited to $600 per non-warranty unit repaired (without
program office approval). Sixty-three percent or
approximately 38,000 of the warranties were for 24 months.
The warranty duration varied depending upon the vendors
•
products.
c. Potential Logistical Support Problems
Potential support problems included integration,
shipping costs, and turn around time. The respondents believed
the support concept complemented the acguisition strategy
(three vendors, three different items) because the vendors
were responsible for repairing their own products. Also,
support costs were low because the STU III had a very low
failure rate (no figures provided).
Responses suggested that integration problems
could occur if new or modified GFE equipment was introduced.
For these different systems to operate effectively, the
cryptographic devices must be compatible with all the systems.
If the STU Ills had high failure rates, shipping costs could
be expensive. In addition, the (repair/return) turn around
times would increase because all systems must be checked at
the depot before they are sent to the contractor for repair.
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For example, the average shipping cost to send a
potential defective unit from the user to the depot was
approximately $38. If the system was nonoperational, an
additional $38 would be required to ship the defective unit
from the depot to the vendors for repair. A failure rate of
150 systems per month would cost $11,400 or $136,000 per year
in shipping costs.
3. AN/PSS-12 Mine Detector
The Mine Detecting Set is a portable detecting system
capable of detecting small metallic objects, antipersonnel and
antitank mines in any type of environment to include salt
water, beaches, and magnetic soils. The set weighs 29.3
pounds and the extended length is 5.3 feet.
a. Acquisition Strategy
The AN/PSS 12 Mine Detector was the only foreign
source NDI for this study. The acquisition strategy was to
procure the best available military mine detector from the
market through a nondevelopmental program. This program
started out as a modernization program for the AN/PSS-11 Mine
Detector, which was fielded in 1962.
Eventually, the Army experienced problems in
procuring spare parts to support the AN/PSS-11. The Army
allocated funds for the procurement of the AN/PSS-12 during FY
86. Two successive contractors were unable to produce an
acceptable solution because of technical and financial
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problems [Ref. 18: p. 1]. The acquisition strategy was then
modified to use a military specification with approved
performance criteria (from the user), in lieu of a
requirements document.
Market analysis revealed that a new surge of
commercial militarized mine detectors was available on the
commercial market, which would support an NDI strategy. Also,
information from the U.S. Marine Corps and NATO was available
that supported this strategy. The U.S. Marine Corps and some
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries had
completed extensive evaluation of several commercially
available mine detectors [Ref. 18 :p. 1]. The results from
these tests were promising. The Army conducted tests on
several commercial mine detectors before selecting one vender
for the AN/PSS-12 procurement contract.
Once this acquisition strategy was adopted, the
mine detector was fielded in approximately two years. The
AN/PSS-12 Mine Detector was an example of a commercial item
designed to operate in a combat environment. A total of
29,487 AN/PSS-12 Mine Detectors were bought at a cost of
$45,994,000. The mine detector unit cost was approximately
$1,600 each.
Respondents indicated that an advantage of this
acquisition strategy was the ability to tailor the acquisition
process. The program overcame early technical development
problems by changing the acquisition strategy so that
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alternative commercial products could be used. In addition,
the program was able to bring foreign sources into the
resource pool.
The program office discussed some potential
concerns when dealing with a foreign contractor during the
interviews. A key question was: "What happens if the foreign
contractor's government becomes unfriendly toward our
Government?" Respondents indicated that this issue should
always be addressed early in the decisionmaking process. In
this case, some of this information was a part of the market
surveys/analysis
.
First, historical performance information was
available on contractors. The two countries involved had a
long history of military and political cooperation and
treaties with the U.S. Also, DOD Foreign Military Sales and
State Department policies and guidelines were reviewed as
sources of information. Schedule and transportation issues
were also addressed.
b. Support Method
The AN/PSS-12 Mine detector used interim
contractor support to develop an organic support system. The
program office chose to implement an organic support system
because some AN/PSS-11 support structures were still in place
and could be modified to support the AN/PSS-12. In this case,
interim contractor maintenance support was scheduled for the
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first two years of fielding to assist in the transition
process. All maintenance, except battery replacement and
preventive maintenance checks and services, would be
accomplished by the contractor during the interim period [Ref
.
18:p. 5].
Once organic support was in place, maintenance
would be performed by military organizations. All of the
components, except the electronic unit, could be discarded
upon failure. When the electronic unit failed, it was sent to
direct support maintenance for repair. There, the user would
receive a replacement unit or wait for a support unit to
repair the electronic unit. The electronic unit circuit card
would be discarded upon failure. The program was in the first
year of contractor support when this research was conducted.
Comments from the respondents indicated that
organic support was ideal for this program because of the
results from the previous AN/PSS-11 support program. The
AN/PSS-11 utilized an organic support system similar to the
AN/PSS-12. Much of the maintenance organization and required
maintenance skills between the detectors was alike. Also,
this support method did not require changes to the force
structure. However, interim contractor support was needed for




c. Potential Logistical Support Problems
Potential support problems included coordination,
support responsibilities, and delays. A transition program
requires coordination between the PM's office and the
contractor to insure that all the requirements are met on
time. A transition plan should specify support
responsibilities between the Government and the contractor
while transitioning from contractor support to organic
support. For example, delays in Government preparation could
require additional contractor support and increase program
costs. Contractor delays could cause the fielding schedule to
be postponed if the Government support system is not
implemented early. The AN/PSS-12 has included some transition
instructions in the Logistic Support Plan and more detailed
instructions in the support contract; however, these
instructions may not be sufficient for a smooth transition.
4. AN/PSN-11 Precision Lightweight Global Positioning
Receiver (PLGR)
The PLGR is one of the NDI commercial receivers
integrated into NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS).
The GPS consists of 24 satellites, a satellite control
segment, and user sets (like the PLGR). The PLGR is a hand
held device that was similar to a cellular telephone in size
and weight and provides navigation and global position
information to the individual user.
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a. Acquisition Strategy
A nondevelopmental acquisition strategy was used
to develop and procure the PLGR. The program office had prior
experience with NDI GPS receivers during Operation Desert
Storm Those GPS receivers were used on the PATRIOT Air
Defense Missile System, and the Apache helicopter [Ref. 19 :p.
2]. All the commercial GPS receivers available required
minor military modifications in order to integrate with GPS
satellites [Ref. 19:p. 3].
The GPS Project Office expects to award support
contracts to multiple vendors in early 1993. Fielding is
scheduled in late 1994. The PLGR purchase will be for
approximately 35,000 units at cost of $175,000,000. The unit
cost will be between $4, 000-$6, 000 each (depending upon the
modification required). (Exact costs could not be released
because the contract was under protest at the time of the
interviews. ) The PLGR program kept the unit cost close to the
commercial market cost because it was a large volume
procurement (although some minor military modifications were
required)
.
Another advantage for this acquisition strategy
was that the program office had a positive experience with
commercial GPS receivers during Operation Desert Storm and
understood the support requirements. The vendors responded




The PLGR program plans to use a contractor/organic
support concept similar to the STU III program. In this case,
the contractor would conduct all repair maintenance except for
those items identified as user replaceable parts, (e.g.,
handset, powercord, antenna etc.) at a depot. The program
considered two depot options. One option was for the unit to
return nonoperational PLGRs directly to a Government
owned/contractor operated facility for repair [Ref 19 :p. 17].
In return, the contractor would send an operational PLGR
directly to the unit (direct exchange). The second option was
to use the contractor's depot facilities instead of Government
Depot facilities. All PLGRs will come with a five-year
warranty. Contractor repairs will be limited to $250 per
non-warranty unit repaired (without program office approval).
Interview results indicate that the respondents
believed the support concept complemented the acquisition
strategy because the vendors would be responsible for
repairing their own products. Therefore, support costs would
be low ($250 per unit repaired). According to the
respondents, GPS receivers exhibited a very low failure rate
during Operation Desert Storm (no figures provided) and the
project office expects similar performance from the PLGR.
Integration of new equipment or interoperability with other
vendors' products was not a concern because each receiver
communicates independently with the GPS satellites. Also,
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this method was attractive because it did not affect the force
structure. No new maintenance personnel were required because
the contractor does all the repair work.
c. Potential Logistical Support Problems
Potential support problems included high failure
rates, shipping costs, and turn around times. According to the
respondents, if the PLGRs had high failure rates, shipping
costs could be expensive and repair/return turn around times
could increase. Also, high failure rates would require
increases in the inventory to maintain readiness and reduce
repair/return turn around times.
D. SUMMARY
• Contractor Support.
Each of these programs selected support strategies
that best suited their program needs. The Omega Navigational
System used total contractor support because the system's
reliability characteristics were very favorable and the
maintenance plan was simple and responsive. The AN/PSS Mine
Detector utilized interim contractor support until an organic
support system could be established. A contractor/organic
support concept was used by with the STU III program. PLGR
chose a contractor/organic support method because the support
method complemented the acquisition strategy and the
maintenance plan was simple.
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• Market Analysis
In these cases, market surveys and analysis played
important roles in shaping the acquisition and support
strategies. Market surveys identified potential commercial
products with multiple sources that could meet the programs'
operational and support requirements for the STU III and the
PLGR. The important advantages from the STU III acquisition
were that multiple resources (three vendors) were used to
expand the resource base and insure that fair and reasonable
prices ($1,995 unit cost) could be maintained through
competition. The PLGR followed a procurement strategy similar
to the STU III and experienced similar results.
Market surveys also identified foreign sources in the
case of the AN/PSS-12 Mine Detector program. Therefore, the
program could shift from a developmental program to a
nondevelopmental program because a new product was identified.
The AN/PSS-12 program kept the unit cost down ($1,600) because
the item was an NDI militarized commercial product.
The ONS kept the unit cost affordable ($13,700) with
a small quantity buy (359 systems) because the market survey
identified a commercial off-the-shelf system that required no
modifications. The contractor's repair costs (no more than
$600 per unit) and support performance were analyzed and
considered acceptable.
• Omega Navigational System
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The ONS used a total contractor support concept
because the maintenance repair/return turn around time was a
major concern. The program streamlined the support system
because nonoperational units were sent directly from the user
to the contractor for repair, and then returned to the user.
The program office bought a system that required no unit
maintenance, easily replaced spares (plug in/ out), had a low
failure rate, and can be shipped by air.
• Mine Detector
The program office used interim contractor support
until an organic support system could become fully
operational. Some organic support mechanisms from the old
mine detector program were still in place and were utilized.
However, the program office needed time to organize the
support structure and insure that it was operational before
program implementation. Interim contractor support allowed
the program to conduct an orderly transition from total
contractor support to organic support.
• Secure Telephone Unit III
The STU III chose to employ a contractor/organic (MIX)
support system. Contractor maintenance (repair/return) was
through the original equipment manufacturers, since the
procurement contract was split among three vendors.
Nonoperational units were sent from the user to a Government
owned/contractor operated depot facility. The depot conducted
a simple operational check to determine if the equipment was
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nonoperational and should be sent to the contractor for
repair. The program office wanted to ensure that the unit was
nonoperational before sending them to the contractor for
repair.
• Global Positioning System Receiver (PLGR)
This program was another example where the program office
had experience with a similar acquisition because NDI GPS
receivers were procured during Operation Desert Storm. GPS
receivers exhibited a very low failure rate during Operation
Desert Storm and the program office expects similar
performance from the PLGR. Therefore, the PLGR program
planned to use a contractor/organic support concept similar to
the STU III program. The program office considered two
support options: 1) the contractor would conduct all repair
maintenance at a Government owned/contractor operated
facility; or 2) repair would be conducted at a pure contractor
operated facility. The PLGR program considered splitting the
procurement contract among multiple vendors, like the STU III
program, to expand their resource base and ensure fair prices.
• Potential Logistic Support Problems







NDI programs relying on contractor support considered
using military transportation assets as back-up transportation
during wartime. Commercial transportation cannot be
guaranteed in combat environments. Another concern with
commercial transportation is shipping costs. Programs not
using organic support relied upon commercial transportation to
ship spare parts and for repair/return of nonoperational
units.
Contractor solvency was also a concern for NDI
programs. Other commercial products may not be suitable
substitutes as replacement systems in the event a contractor
goes out of business. Product incompatibility and
integration was a concern when using multiple vendors.
NDI programs using contractor support to transition to
organic or a contractor/organic support mix must ensure that
the transition plans clearly define contractor and Government
responsibilities. Otherwise the program could experience
fielding delays.
• Other Issues
DOD does not have a formal information system to
gather and access effectiveness of its NDI acquisitions. The
Army's Acquisition Management Milestone System (AMMS) was used
to collect information on Army NDI programs. However, the
listings did not specify the NDIs' procurement methods or the
type and degree of nondevelopmental effort.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
•
A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This thesis focused upon contractor support strategies for
Nondevelopmental Items (NDI) since nondevelopmental item
alternatives usually require a departure from traditional
support methods. Alternative logistical support strategies
were identified and analyzed from several different major
nondevelopmental item acquisitions. These strategies may
enable U.S. Army Program Managers to maximize the benefits of
using individualized and tailored support strategies for
nondevelopmental acquisition. All programs researched appear
to have successful logistical support programs. However,
several potential logistical support problems were identified.
B. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS
• NDI Is An Important Acquisition Strategy.
Nondevelopmental item acquisition capitalizes on the
use of commercial "state-of-the-art" technologies while
providing DOD with effective and economical solutions to
operational requirements. Furthermore, NDI acquisition has
shown quality trends to be as good as, if not better than,
specially developed items when they are purchased to meet a
military requirement. Also, nondevelopmental item
acquisitions have lowered life cycle costs because NDIs can
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usually skip most of the research and development phases of
the acquisition process. Simply stated, NDI should be one of
the first materiel alternatives considered.
• NDI Strategy Should Be Implemented Early.
The decision to use NDI should be made early in the
planning process. Then, the support strategy can complement
the acquisition strategy. Identification and consideration of
support constraints should be conducted early in the
acquisition planning process before contract award. Fixes for
unanticipated problems usually increase a program's life cycle
cost. The benefits of a shorter NDI acquisition cycle are
negated if the support system is not in place or is inadequate
when a system is fielded.
• Market Analysis Should Be Conducted For Each NDI
Program.
Market analysis is important in the acquisition
planning process because it can identify possible commercial
NDI alternatives. The market analysis reveals the strength of
the commercial resource base. A strong resource base usually
means more competition, more alternatives, and better quality
commercial products. The market analysis also helps identify
potential risks and constraints in the acquisition and support
strategies. Therefore, the market analysis should be conducted
early in the planning process.
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• Support Method Should Be implemented Early.
Since NDI acquisitions have a shorter acquisition
cycle than classical acquisitions, logistic planners have less
time to plan and implement support systems. Fielding
schedules could be delayed if the support system is not in
place. The requirements to conduct Logistical Support
Analysis, develop Integrated Logistical Support Plans, and
approve other program management documents do not change
because a program is nondevelopmental.
• Support Strategy Should Be Tailored To The NDI
Program .
NDI support strategies are flexible and can be tailored.
A noncombat Category A NDI may not require any modifications
or development to operate in a commercial like environment.
The maintenance support plan designed for this item would be
ideal for no support (discard upon failure) or total
contractor support options (as discussed in Chapter III). A
Category B NDI may require organic support or integrate a mix
of contractor/organic support even if used in combat.
However, total contractor support in combat environments
requires more coordination for repair/return operations and
spare systems to maintain the availability demands.
• Contractor Support Considered As A Possible
Alternative For Every NDI Program.
Contractor support can be tailored to almost any
support method, even setting up an organic support system.
Operation Desert Storm demonstrated how contractor support
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could be used in a combat environment. Some programs
discovered that contractor support is flexible. The contractor
is responsible and preforms all maintenance under the total
contractor support method. Contractor depot support is
conducted at GOCO and contractor facilities under
contractor/organic concepts. Interim contractor support can
be used to transition programs from one support method to
another.
• Use Competition For NDI When Possible.
By using commercial items, DOD can capitalize on
economies of scale and achieve effectiveness with quality
equipment. Some studies indicate that competitive pressures
lead directly to lower system prices. Therefore, by choosing
a nondevelopmental acquisition strategy, unit costs of low
quantity purchases will be more likely to reflect commercial
production costs. Additionally, NDIs are structured to take
advantage of the competitive forces in the marketplace because
the Government becomes another buyer in a market with many
suppliers. Initiatives stimulating efficiency and competition
include streamlining weapons systems maintenance operations,
and allowing military maintenance depots and private firms to
compete for maintenance work.
• Potential Logistical Support Problems.
The following potential logistical support problems were




Contractor turn around and shipping costs.
Contractor solvency and industrial base.
Multiple source item integration and compatibility.
Transition from contractor to organic support.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
• Programs Should Consider NDI As An Alternative
Acquisition Strategy.
NDI alternatives should be considered as viable solutions
to some DOD materiel needs. There are many instructions that
require the Pms to consider NDI alternatives in the
acquisition planning process. The Government should start
developmental programs only if NDIs do not fulfill the user's
needs. Therefore, NDI alternatives should continue to be
considered through all acquisition phases because NDIs can be
used to introduce new technologies into existing programs.
• NDI Programs Should Identify Their Support Strategy
Early In The Decisionmaking Process.
In order for logistical support to be effective, it
must be included early in the acquisition planning process.
NDIs have a shorter acquisition cycle than a classical
development program. Therefore, there could be a tendency to
field a system before the support system is operational. The
support strategy can complement the acquisition strategy when
given equal planning consideration.
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• DOD Should Develop A System To Measure The
Effectiveness Of NDI Procurement.
DOD has no DOD wide information system to track or
measure the effectiveness of NDI acquisitions. Listings do
not specify NDI procurement methods or the type and degree of
nondevelopmental effort. Joint NDI programs are used more
frequently to reduce costs and meet Service wide needs. The
need for systems integration is increasing, as is the
participation of NDIs. Therefore, each service component needs
to develop its own system to collect and assess NDI
procurement.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
• Foreign NDI Acquisition Alternatives.
Viable foreign NDI alternatives should be investigated
and identified in the market analysis. Further research is
necessary in order to establish the criteria for assessing the
feasibility of foreign NDI acquisition. Case studies
involving current DOD foreign source NDIs could be used to
initially identify these criteria. Also, it would be helpful
to identify the potential benefits and problems associated
with current or past DOD foreign source NDIs.
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APPENDIX B: NONDEVELOPMENTAL ITEM PREFERENCE POLICY AND
DEFINITION
1. United States Code, Title 10, Section 2325 "Preference for
nondevelopmental items"
(a) PREFERENCE.—The Secretary of Defense shall insure
that, to the maximum extent practicable
—
(1) requirements of the Department of Defense with
response to a procurement of supplies are stated
in terms of
—
(A) functions to be performed:
(B) performance required: or
(C) essential physical characteristics:
(2) such requirements are defined so that
nondevelopmental items may be procured to fulfill
such requirements: and
(3) such requirements are fulfilled through the
procurement of nondevelopmental items.
(b) IMPLEMENTATION.—The Secretary of Defense shall carry
out this section through the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, who shall have
responsibility for its effective implementation.
(c) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary of Defense shall
prescribe regulations to carry out this section.
(d) DEFINITION.— In this section, the term
"nondevelopmental" means
—
(1) any item of supply that is available in the
commercial marketplace;
(2) any previously-developed item of supply that is in
use by the department or agency of the United
States, a State or local government, or a foreign
government with which the United States has a
mutual defense cooperation agreement;
(3) any item of supply described in paragraph (1) or
(2) that requires only minor modification in order
to meet the requirements of the procuring agency;
or
(4) any item of supply that is currently being
produced that does not meet the requirements of




(A) is not yet in use; or
(B) is not yet available in the commercial
marketplace.
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1 Primary Research Question:
Should the Department of Defense (DOD) utilize total
contractor support for Nondevelopmental Item (NDI)
acquisitions?
2 Subsidiary Research Questions
(a) What is nondevelopmental item acquisition?
(1) Is NDI acquisition different from a system under
full development?
(2) What was the reason(s) for choosing an NDI
solution?
(b) What are the most commonly used logistical support
strategies in nondevelopmental item acquisition?
(1) What support system did your program choose, no
support, contractor/commercial, organic, or a mix?
(2) What were the advantages and disadvantages of your
support system?
(3) When, during the acquisition process, was the
support system considered?
(c) What logistical support requirements are considered in
the design of nondevelopmental item acquisition
support systems?
(1) Was cost a consideration?
(2) Was schedule/delivery a consideration?
(3) Was contractor performance a consideration?
(d) How does the anticipated operational environment
affect the logistical support strategy?
(1) What program characteristics affect how the system
will be supported?
(2) What system use characteristics affect how the
system will be supported?
(3) Was the NDI strictly an "off-the-shelf" item or
did it require minor modifications because of its
operational environment?
(e) Are Integrated Logistical Support Plans (ILSPs)
aligned to the acquisition strategy?
(1) Does the program have an ILSP?
(2) If not, what is the program using for an ILSP?
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APPENDIX D: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED
This research effort included interviews with the following
individuals:
1. Guest, Dan. Brigadier General (USA). Program Executive
Officer for Communications Systems, U.S. Army
Communications and Electronic Command. Ft. Monmouth, NJ. 4
March, 1992.
2. Jansons, Pete. Product Manager for Modular Azimuth
Positioning System. Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. 5 November, 1992.
3. Lading, Mike. Deputy Program Manager for FSVS. U.S. Army
CEOCOM Communication Logistics Support Activity, UT. 23
February, 1993.
4. McGhee, Michael. Program Manager for AN/PSS-12. U.S.
Army Aviation and Troop Support Command, St. Louis, MO. 15
January, 1993.
5. Mulligan, Don. Lieutenant Colonel (USA). Logistics
Manager for NDI Support. Logistics Support for NDI Products,
U.S. Army Communications and Electronic Command. Ft.
Monmouth, NJ. 6 January, 1993.
6. Ohliber, Ron. Director, Electronics Integration
Directorate Research and Development, U.S. Army Communications
and Electronic Command. Ft. Monmouth, NJ. 12 December 1992.
7. Riggs, Gary. Logistics Support Integrator. U.S. Army
CEOCOM Communication Logistics Support Activity, UT. 12
January, 1993.
8. Sweeny, Bruce. Colonel (USA). Project Manager. U.S. Army
Communications and Electronic Command. Ft. Monmouth, NJ. 21
May, 1992.
9. West, Lynn. Program Manager for FSVS. U.S. Army CEOCOM
Communication Logistics Support Activity, UT. 5 January,
1993.
10. Woods, Beverly. Logistics Manager. U.S. Army Aviation
and Troop Support Command, St. Louis, MO. 15 January, 1993.
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11. Zoltek, Joe. Logistics Manager for NDI. Logistics
Support for NDIs, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ. 5 November 1992.
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